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Abstract
We investigate how cost conditions of private rms aect optimal privatization policy and
private rms' prots. We nd that the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the
costs of private rms unless the public rm is fully privatized in equilibrium. A cost reduction in
a private rm increases the degree of privatization and benets for all private rms. Therefore,
each private rm's prot is increasing with its rival private rms' costs, which is in contrast
to the result when the degree of privatization is given exogenously. This interesting property
yields two important results. The prot of each private rm can increase with the number of
private rms, and the positive externality of innovation accelerates private rms' R&D.
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1 Introduction
For more than 50 years, we have observed a worldwide wave of the privatization of state-owned
public enterprises. Nevertheless, many public and partially privatized enterprises are still active
in planned and market economies in developed, developing, and transitional countries. While
some public enterprises are traditional monopolists in natural monopoly markets, a considerable
number of public and partially privatized enterprises competes with private enterprises in a wide
range of industries.1 Optimal privatization policies in such mixed oligopolies have attracted ex-
tensive attention from economics researchers in such elds as industrial organization, international
economics, public economics, nancial economics, and development economics.2
Specically, the literature on mixed oligopolies has investigated optimal privatization policy in
dierent situations. Matsumura (1998) investigated Cournot mixed duopolies and showed that the
optimal degree of privatization is never zero unless full nationalization yields a public monopoly.
Lin and Matsumura (2012) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015) found that the optimal degree of
privatization increases with the number of private rms and decreases with the foreign ownership
share in private rms. In free-entry markets, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) showed that the
optimal degree of privatization is zero when private competitors are domestic, while Cato and
Matsumura (2012) found that the optimal degree of privatization is strictly positive when private
competitors are foreign and increases with the foreign ownership share in private rms. In addition,
Chen (2017) showed that the optimal degree of privatization is positive even in free-entry markets if
privatization improves production eciency. Fujiwara (2007) showed a nonmonotonic (monotonic)
relationship between the degree of product dierentiation and optimal degree of privatization in a
non-free-entry (free-entry) market. Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship between
optimal trade and privatization policies, showing that a higher tari rate reduces the optimal
degree of privatization in free-entry markets. Lee et al. (2017) showed that the optimal degree
1Examples include United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, Areva, Nippon Telecom and Telecommu-
nication (NTT), Japan Tobacco, Volkswagen, Renault, Electricite de France, Japan Postal Bank, Kampo, Korea
Development Bank, and Korea Investment Corporation.
2For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this eld, see Heywood and Ye (2009a), Ishida
and Matsushima (2009), Chen (2017), and the works cited therein.
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of privatization depends on the timing of privatization. Heywood et al. (2017) investigated how
asymmetric information on demand conditions aects the optimal degree of privatization.
One common assumption in the abovementioned studies is that all private rms share the
same cost function. However, in mixed oligopolies, it is often the case that private rms are
not symmetric. In the Japanese nancial industry, public nancial institutions compete with
mega banks, such as the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, and smaller regional banks, such as
Aozora Bank. In the overnight delivery industry, Japan Post competes with Yamato Transport,
Nippon Express, Sagawa Express, and Seino Transportation, which are far from symmetric. In the
telecommunication industry, NTT group competes with large carriers, such as Softbank and KDDI
Corp., as well as many of smaller companies, such as Japan Communication. In the automobile
industry, VW and Rouault compete with huge private rms, such as General Motors and Toyota
Motor Corp., as well as smaller private rms, such as Hyundai Motor Company, Honda Motor Co.
Ltd., and Mazda Motor Corp. Thus, it is realistic to assume that private rms are not always
symmetric.
In this study, we allow cost asymmetry among private rms. This enriches the analysis of
mixed oligopolies. For example, suppose that a decrease in private rms' costs increases these
rms' prots. If we allow asymmetric costs among private rms, we can decompose this cost-
reduction eect into the following two eects: the eect of the reduction of a rm's own cost and
that of its rival's cost. Then, we can investigate how the rival's cost aects prots and thus, the
behavior of other private rms. In this study, we use the model of Pal (1998) with linear demand
and constant marginal costs, and we allow cost dierences among private rms. We adopt the
partial privatization approach of Matsumura (1998) and endogenize the degree of privatization.
We nd that under optimal privatization policy, the reduction of a private rm's marginal cost
increases the prots of all private rms. Under the optimal privatization policy, a reduction of
a private rm's marginal cost increases the degree of privatization, which makes the public rm
less aggressive. This is benecial for all private rms and thus, the reduction of a private rm's
marginal cost is benecial for all private rms. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is given
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exogenously, the reduction of a private rm's marginal cost increases its own prot but reduces
the other private rms' prot.
This basic principle can apply to mixed oligopolies with symmetric private rms, and we derive
important implications even in models with these rms. First, we investigate the relationship
between the new entry of a private rm and the optimal degree of privatization. We nd that the
new entry of a private rm increases the degree of privatization, which increases the prots of all
private rms. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is given exogenously, the new entry of a
private rm decreases the prots of all incumbent private rms.
Next, we investigate an innovation incentive for private rms. We formulate a model in which
private rms engage in cost-reducing R&D investments with externality among private rms. We
nd that private rms more intensively engage in innovation when the degree of privatization is
endogenous. In addition, we nd that R&D expenditure is increasing with the degree of spillover
eect among private rms and the number of private rms when the degree of privatization is
endogenous. These ndings are because a decrease of one private rm's cost increases the prots
of all private rms. These results suggest that the timing of privatization aects the entry decision
and innovation activities of private rms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model.
Section 3 presents an equilibrium analysis and derives the optimal privatization policy. Section
4 discusses the relationship between private rms' prots and their costs. Section 5 investigates
the relationship between private rms' prots and new entries. Section 6 endogenizes the costs of
private rms by considering cost-reducing R&D. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a mixed oligopoly model in which one public rm (rm 0) competes with n private
rms (rms 1, 2,...,n). These rms produce homogeneous products for which the inverse demand
function is
p(Q) = a Q;
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where p denotes price, a is a positive constant, and Q :=
Pn
i=0 qi is the total output. The marginal
costs are constant. Let ci  0 be the rm i's marginal cost. Each rm's prot is given by
i = (p(Q)  ci)qi:
We assume that ci < c0 for i = 1; 2; :::; n. In other words, we assume that the public rm is less
ecient than the private rm.3
The social surplus W is given by
W =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq   pQ+
nX
i=0
i =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq  
nX
i=0
ciqi:
Following Matsumura (1998), the public rm's objective 
 is convex-combination of social surplus
and their own prot,

 = 0 + (1  )W;
where  2 [0; 1] represents the degree of privatization. In the case of full nationalization (i.e.,
 = 0), rm 0 maximizes social welfare. In the case of full privatization (i.e.,  = 1), rm 0
maximizes its prot. Each private rm's objective is its prot.
The complete information game runs as follows. In the rst stage, the government chooses
the degree of privatization  to maximize the social surplus. In the second stage, each rm
simultaneously chooses its output to maximize its objective. We solve this game by backward
induction and the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Throughout this
study, we assume that a is suciently large. It guarantees that the solutions in the second-stage
subgames are interior. In other words, the public rm produces a positive output in equilibrium
regardless of .
3The assumptions of linear demand and constant marginal costs with cost disadvantage of a public rm over
private rms is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Pal (1998), Capuano and De Feo (2010), and
Matsumura and Ogawa (2010). For a discussion on the endogenous cost disadvantage of public rms, see Matsumura
and Matsushima (2004).
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3 Equilibrium
First, we solve the second stage game given . The rst-order conditions of public and private
rms are
@

@q0
= a  (1 + )q0  
nX
i=1
qi   c0 = 0;
@i
@qi
= a  2qi  
X
j 6=i
qj   ci = 0 (i = 1; :::n);
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. These rst-order conditions yield the
following reaction functions of public and private rms
R0(qi) =
a Pni=1 qi   c0
1 + 
;
Ri(qj) =
a Pj 6=i qj   ci
2
(i = 1; 2; :::; n j 6= i);
respectively. These reaction functions yield the following equilibrium quantities of public and
private rms
q0() =
a  (n+ 1)c0 +
Pn
i=1 ci
1 + (n+ 1)
; (1)
qi () =
(a+
Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci
1 + (n+ 1)
(i = 1; 2; :::; n); (2)
respectively. We obtain the following equilibrium total output, price, private rm's prot, and
welfare
Q() =
(na Pni=1 ci)+ a  c0
1 + (n+ 1)
; (3)
p() =
(a+
Pn
i=1 ci)+ c0
1 + (n+ 1)
; (4)
i () =

(a+
Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci
1 + (n+ 1)
2
(i = 1; 2; :::; n); (5)
W () =
X1
2(1 + (n+ 1))2
; (6)
respectively, where X1 := (a(1+n) c0 
Pn
i=1 ci)
2+2(a (n+1)c0+
Pn
i=1 ci)
2+2
Pn
i=1((a+Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci)2.
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Next, we discuss the government's welfare maximization problem in the rst stage. Let  be
the equilibrium degree of privatization.
Lemma 1 (i)  > 0: (ii)  = minf; 1g, where
 :=
nc0  
Pn
i=1 ci
a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci
:
(iii)  is decreasing in ci for i = 1; 2; :::; n and increasing in c0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 1(i) was shown by Matsumura (1998) in duopolies and by Matsumura and Kanda
(2005) in oligopolies with symmetry among private rms.
Lemma 1(iii) states that as long as the solution is interior (i.e., full privatization is not optimal),
the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the cost of each private rm. An increase of
the degree of privatization makes rm 0 less aggressive, because it is less concerned with consumer
surplus. Through the strategic interaction, the less aggressive behavior of rm 0 makes private rms
more aggressive. In other words, production substitution from the public rm to the private rms
takes place. Because the marginal cost of the public rm is higher than that of each private rm,
this production substitution improves welfare (welfare-improving eect).4 However, because the
total output is decreasing in , an increase of the degree of privatization reduces welfare (welfare-
reducing eect). This trade-o determines the optimal degree of privatization. The higher (lower)
c0 (ci for i = 1; 2; :::; n) is, the stronger is the abovementioned welfare improving eect of the
production substitution. Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is increasing in c0 and
decreasing in ci for i = 1; 2; :::; n.
From Lemma 1(ii), we nd that the optimal degree of privatization remains unchanged as long
as
Pn
i=1 ci remains unchanged. This includes an important policy implication. Given the average
productivity among private rms, the distribution of the costs among private rms (or the degree
of heterogeneity among private rms) does not aect the optimal privatization policy.
4For an excellent discussion on the welfare-improving production substitution, see Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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4 Private Firms' Prots
Suppose that the solution of the rst stage is interior (i.e.,  < 1). By substituting  into i (),
we obtain the following equilibrium prot of private rms:
i =
 
(n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci   ci
!2
(i = 1; 2; :::; n): (7)
We now present our main result.
Proposition 1 If the optimal privatization policy is not full privatization (i.e.,  < 1), private
rm i's prot is decreasing in cj for i; j = 1; 2; :::; n and increasing in c0.
Proof See Appendix.
In order to highlight the implication and intuition of this result, we present a supplementary
result as a benchmark.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the degree of privatization  is given exogenously. (i) Private rm
i's prot is decreasing in ci and increasing in c0. (ii) Private rm i's prot is nondecreasing in cj
for i = 1; 2; :::; n; j =; 1; :::; n and j 6= i. (iii) If  > 0, private rm i's prot is increasing in cj for
i = 1; 2; :::; n; j =; 1; :::; n and j 6= i.
Proof See the Appendix.
In both exogenous and endogenous  cases, private rm i's prot is decreasing with its own cost
and this result is intuitive. A reduction of ci directly increases rm i's prot even when all rms'
outputs are given exogenously. In addition, a decrease in ci improves the competitive advantage of
rm i and increases the equilibrium output of rm i. Through the strategic interaction, a reduction
of ci reduces the total output of other rms, which further increases rm i's prot.
Suppose that  is given exogenously. Private rm i's prot is increasing with its rivals' costs,
which is an intuitive result. A reduction of cj (j 6= i) increases rm j's output (direct eect) and
though strategic interaction, decreases the other rms' outputs, including rm i's output (strategic
eect). This reduction of rm i's output reduces its prot. In addition, a reduction of cj increases
the total output, and further reduces rm i's prot.
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However, when  is endogenous, an additional eect exists. A reduction of cj (j 6= i) increases
, and makes the public rm (rm 0) less aggressive. This eect is so strong that a reduction of
cj (j 6= i) increases the prots of all private rms.
This result suggests that as long as the solution is interior (i.e.,  < 1), private rms that
compete with a public rm have incentives to reduce the private rivals' costs as well as their
own costs. This fact might suggest that a recent open strategy of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Nikkei
Newspaper, May 3, 2017) to reduce its own cost as well as those of other private rms is reasonable.
From Proposition 1, we guess that the new entry of a private rm might increase the prots of
incumbents because it also increases the degree of privatization. In addition, we guess that private
rms engage in cost-reducing R&D more intensively when the privatization policy is determined
after R&D activity and when there is a stronger spillover eect that reduces the private rivals'
costs. We discuss these problems in the following two sections.
5 New Entry
5.1 New entry of a private rm
We consider how the entry of a private rm aects the prots of incumbent private rms. Suppose
that a new entrant, rm n+1, enters the market. We assume that cn+1 < c0. First, we consider
the situation in which  is determined before the entry.
Lemma 2 Suppose that  is given exogenously. The new entry of a private rm reduces the prots
of all incumbent private rms.
Proof See the Appendix.
Given , the new entry of a private rm accelerates competition and reduces the market share
of each incumbent, and thereby reduces the prots of all rms.
We now consider the situation in which  is determined after the entry.
Proposition 3 Suppose that  < 1. The new entry of a private rm increases .
Proof See the Appendix.
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The new entry of a private rm strengthens the welfare-improving eect of privatization (the
eect of production substitution from the public rm to the private rm), whereas it reduces the
welfare-reducing eect of privatization (the output-reduction eect). Therefore, this new entry
increases the optimal degree of privatization.
We now discuss how the new entry of a private rm aects the prots of incumbent private
rms.
Proposition 4 Suppose that  is endogenous. Suppose that  < 1 even after the entry of rm
n+ 1. Then, the entry of rm n+ 1 increases the prots of all incumbent private rms.
Proof See the Appendix.
A new entry increases the degree of privatization, which makes the public rm less aggressive.
This is benecial for all private rms and thus, a new entry increases the prots of all private
rms.5
5.2 Free entry
We now discuss a free-entry market. We assume that all potential entrants (private rms) share
the same marginal cost c and entry cost F . In the rst stage, each rm i (i = 1; 2; ::; n) chooses
whether to enter the market. In the second stage, after observing n, the government chooses .6
In the third stage, all rms choose their outputs independently.
Let q be the output of each private rm. In the third stage the rst-order conditions of rm 0
and rm i (i = 1; 2; :::n) are
p+ p0q0   c0 = 0; (8)
5Matsumura and Sunada (2013) investigated a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition. They
showed that the new entry of a private rm might increase the prots of the incumbent private rms, because it
increases (decreases) advertising of the public rm (private rms). Some studies on private oligopolies have showed
that a new entry could increase the prots of incumbents. Mukherjee and Zhao (2009) considered an asymmetric
Stackelberg setting in which there are two incumbent rms (leader) with dierent marginal costs and a potential
entrant (follower) with a higher marginal cost. The authors then show that the existence of an inecient follower
can increase the prot of the more ecient leader. Ishida et al. (2011) considered a model in which a dominant
rm competes with minor rms and showed that an increase of the number of minor rms accelerates the R&D and
prot of the dominant rm. Chen and Riordan (2007) showed that in a dierentiated market, an increase of variety
by a new entry might soften competition and increase the prots of incumbent rms. The driving force of our study
is dierent from that in these studies.
6For examples supporting this timeline (entry then privatization), see Lee et al. (2017).
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p+ p0q   c = 0; (9)
respectively.
In the second stage, the government chooses  such that
 = min
n n(c0   c)
a  (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c ; 1
o
: (10)
In the rst stage, each rm i (i = 1; 2; :::n) enters the market as long as the prot is nonnegative.
Therefore, as long as n > 0,
(p  c)q   F = 0: (11)
By denition
q0 + nq = Q: (12)
These ve equations determine the equilibrium values of q0; q; Q; n; and . The free-entry
equilibrium is locally stable if the prot of each private rm is decreasing in n. As we showed in
the previous subsection, the prot of each rm is increasing in n as long as  < 1. Therefore,
as long as  < 1; the equilibrium must be locally unstable. Under these conditions,  must be
one (full privatization) at the locally stable equilibrium. These discussions lead to the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 If n > 0, at the locally stable equilibrium  = 1.
If F is large enough, no private rm enters the market. In this case,  = 0. Therefore, in
the constant marginal cost model, the free-entry equilibrium yields either a public monopoly or a
private oligopoly in which the government fully privatizes rm 0.7
6 R&D
In this section, we endogenize the marginal costs of private rms. We consider cost-reducing R&D
activities by private rms.8 We assume that all private rms are symmetric at the beginning of
7Most studies on mixed oligopolies in free-entry homogeneous product markets such as Matsumura and Kanda
(2005), Cato and Matsumura (2012, 2015) and Lee et al. (2017), have assumed increasing marginal costs because
the constant marginal cost model yields this technical problem.
8For discussions on R&D in mixed oligopolies, see Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), Matsumura and Matsushima
(2004), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Zikos (2010), Gil-Moltoet al. (2011), and Lee and Tomaru (2017). How-
11
the game.
The marginal cost of rm i is given by
ci(xi;xj) = C   (xi + 
X
j 6=i
xj) (i; j = 1; 2; :::; n; i 6= j)
where C denotes the private rm's marginal cost before R&D, xi is rm i's R&D level, and  2 [0; 1]
is the degree of spillover from other private rms' R&D.9 We assume that C < c0. This assumption
guarantees that the public rm is less ecient, which is also assumed in the previous sections.
Each private rm i's prot and social welfare are
i =
 
p(Q)  ci(xi;xj)

qi   x2i ;
W =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq   pQ+
nX
i=0
i =
Z Q
0
p(q)dq  
nX
i=0
ciqi   
nX
i=1
xi;
respectively, where  is a positive constant. We assume that  is suciently large. This assumption
guarantees the second-order condition and interior solutions in the quantity competition stage.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, each private rm i chooses xi independently. In
the second stage, the government chooses . In the third stage, all rms choose their outputs
independently. We restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium in which all private rms
choose the same x.
We have already solved the second and third subgames. We now solve the rst stage game.
The rst-order condition of each private rm i is10,
@i
@xi
= 2((n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci(xi;xj)  ci(xi;xj))((n  1) + 2)  2xi = 0: (i = 1; 2; :::; n):
This leads to the following equilibrium R&D level.
x =
(n+ 1)(n   + 2)(c0   C)
   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1) : (13)
ever, none of these studies discuss optimal privatization policy. Heywood and Ye (2009c) is the exception. They
investigated the optimal degree of privatization but assumed that privatization occurs before R&D. Therefore, the
authors discussed only our benchmark timeline. Moreover, they discussed a duopoly (only one private rm) and
thus, did not discuss how private rivals' costs aected the prot of the private rm.
9This type of cost-reducing R&D is intensively discussed in the literature on private oligopolies. See Spence
(1984), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Suzumura (1992).
10The second-order condition is satised if  > 1
2((n 1)+2)2
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Then, we obtain the following equilibrium marginal cost c
c =
C   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1)c0
   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1) : (14)
By substituting (14) into  in Lemma 1(ii), we obtain
 =
n(c0   C)
(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)C)   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1)(a  c0) (15)
as long as  < 1:
We now discuss the case with exogenous  as a benchmark. Suppose that  is given exogenously.
The rst-order conditions of each private rm i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) is11,
@i
@xi
= 2
(a+Pj 6=i cj(xj ;xi)  c0) + c0   (1 + n)ci(xi;xj)
1 + (n+ 1)
(n  n+ )+ 1
1 + (n+ 1)

  2xi = 0:
This leads to the following equilibrium R&D level.
x() =
(1 +   (n  1))((a  C) + c0   C)
(1 + (n+ 1))2   (1 + )(1 + (n  1))(1 + n  (n  1)) : (16)
We now present our result on R&D.
Proposition 6 Suppose that  < 1. (i) x() < x: (ii) x is increasing in , whereas x() is
decreasing in . (iii) x is increasing in n, whereas x() is decreasing in n.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 states that the timing of privatization is important for innovation. Expecting
future privatization, private rms competing with a public rm engage in R&D more intensively
to increase the degree of privatization.12
Because the cost reduction of private rivals is benecial for all private rms when  is en-
dogenous, the existence of spillover eect among private rms stimulates R&D. By contrast, when
the degree of privatization is given exogenously, each private rm might less intensively engage in
11The second-order condition is satised if  > ( 1+n (n 1)
1+(n+1)
)2
12However, it might not be welfare-improving. Suppose that the government, not each private rm, chooses x. Let
xS be this second-best R&D level. We obtain that xS < x as long as  < 1 (i.e., the equilibrium R&D investment
level is excessive for social welfare).
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R&D, because the reduction of private rivals' cost reduces the prots of other private rms in this
case. Similarly, expecting future privatization, the new entry of a private rm accelerates private
rms' R&D, because it aects the optimal privatization policy.
An increase in  (or n) increases x as long as  < 1. A further increase in  (or n) increases x
and  will eventually reach one. Thereafter, the equilibrium x is x(1). Therefore, the equilibrium
investment level is nonmonotone with respect to  and n (inverted U-shape).
Finally, we discuss the limitation of our results. We assume that the public rm's cost is given
exogenously. If the spillover eect reduces the public rm's cost, Proposition 6 does not hold. A
decrease in c0 reduces the prots of all private rms, and thus, each private rm has a weaker
incentive for innovation when the spillover eect is stronger.
7 Concluding remarks
In this study, we introduce cost dierences among private rms and investigate how a private
rm's cost aects the optimal degree of privatization and prots of private rms. We nd that a
cost reduction of a private rm reduces the optimal degree of privatization, which is benecial for
all private rms. Therefore, a cost reduction of a private rm increases the prots of all private
rms, which never holds when the degree of privatization is given exogenously. In addition, we
nd that the new entry of a private rm is benecial for all incumbent private rms because it
increases the degree of privatization. Finally, we discuss innovation of private rms and nd that
expecting future privatization accelerates innovation activities of private rms.
In this study, we assume that private rms are domestic. In the literature on mixed oligopolies,
it is known that the nationality of private rms often aects the behavior of a public rm and the
optimal privatization policy. To extend our analysis in this direction is dicult work and remains
for future research.13
13Whether the private rm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed
oligopolies. See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon
(2005a, 2005b), and Heywood and Ye (2009b). The optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the foreign
ownership rate in private rms when the number of private rms is given exogenously (Lin and Matsumura, 2012),
while it is increasing with the foreign ownership rate in private rms in free-entry markets (Cato and Matsumura,
2012).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
From (6), we obtain
@W 
@
=  
 
a  (n+ 1)c0 +
Pn
i=1 ci
 
(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci)  nc0 +
Pn
i=1 ci
 
1 + (n+ 1)
3 :
By substituting  = 0 into this, we obtain
@W 
@

=0
=
 
a  (n+ 1)c0 +
nX
i=1
ci
 
nc0  
nX
i=1
ci

> 0:
This implies Lemma 1(i).
By solving @W =@ = 0 with respect to , we obtain
 =
nc0  
Pn
i=1 ci
a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci
: (17)
The second-order condition
 (a  (n+ 1)
2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci)
4
(a  (n+ 1)c0 +
Pn
i=1 ci)
2
< 0
is satised. Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is  as long as  < 1. This implies
Lemma 1(ii).
From (17), we obtain
@
@ci
=  (a  (n+ 1)
2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci) + (n+ 2)(nc0  
Pn
i=1 ci)
(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci)
2
< 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n);
@
@c0
=
n(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci) + (n+ 1)
2(nc0  
Pn
i=1 ci)
(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci)
2
> 0:
These imply Lemma 1(iii). 
Proof of Proposition 1 From (7), we obtain
@i
@ci
=  4

(n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci   ci

< 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n);
@i
@cj
=  2

(n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci   ci

< 0 (i; j = 1; 2; :::; n j 6= i);
@i
@c0
= 2(n+ 1)

(n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci   ci

> 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n):
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These results imply Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Because we assume interior solutions in the quantity competition stage, from (2) we obtain (a+Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci) > 0. From (5), we obtain
@i ()
@c0
=
2((a+
Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci)
(1 + (n+ 1))2
> 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n); (18)
@i ()
@ci
=  2(1 + n)((a+
Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci)
(1 + (n+ 1))2
< 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n); (19)
@i ()
@cj
=
2(
 
a+
Pn
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 1))ci

(1 + (n+ 1))2
 0 (i; j = 1; 2; :::; n j 6= i): (20)
The strict inequality in (20) holds if and only if  > 0. These imply Proposition 2. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Let 
(n+1)
i () and 
n
i () be the equilibrium prot of rm i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) with and without the
entry of rm n+ 1, respectively, given . We obtain

(n+1)
i () =
 
(a+
Pn+1
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 2))ci
1 + (n+ 2)
!2
(i = 1; 2; :::; n+ 1): (21)
Let q
(n+1)
i () be the equilibrium output of rm i (i = 1; 2; :::; n+ 1) with the entry of rm n+ 1,
given . We obtain
q
(n+1)
i () =
(a+
Pn+1
i=1 ci) + c0   (1 + (n+ 2))ci
1 + (n+ 2)
(i = 1; 2; :::; n+ 1): (22)
Because we assume interior solutions in the quantity competition stage, from (2) and (22), we
obtain (a+
Pn
i=1 ci)+ c0  (1+ (n+1)))ci > 0 and (a+
Pn+1
i=1 ci)+ c0  (1+ (n+2))ci) > 0.
From (21) and (5), we obtain

(n+1)
i ()  ni () =  
X2
(1 + (n+ 2))(1 + (n+ 1))
 0 (i = 1; 2; :::; n) (23)
where X2 := (1+(n+1))((a+
Pn+1
i=1 ci)+c0  (1+(n+2))ci)+(1+(n+2))((a+
Pn
i=1 ci)+
c0  (1+ (n+1))ci)))((a+
Pn
i=1 ci)+ c0  (1+ (n+1))cn+1) > 0: The strict inequality in (23)
holds if and only if  > 0. These imply Lemma 2. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
Let (n+1) and n be the equilibrium degree of privatization with and without the entry of rm
n+ 1, respectively. We obtain
(n+1) =
(n+ 1)c0  
Pn+1
i=1 ci
a  (n+ 2)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn+1
i=1 ci
(24)
as long as (n+1) < 1. From (17) and (24), we obtain
(n+1)   n = X3
(a  (n+ 2)2 + (n+ 1)Pn+1i=1 ci)(a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)Pni=1 ci) > 0;
where X3 := (a  (n+ 1)2c0 + (n+ 2)
Pn
i=1 ci)(c0   cn+1) + ((n+ 2)(c0   cn+1) + (n+ 1)c0)(nc0  Pn
i=1 ci) > 0. This implies Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Let 
(n+1)
i and 
n
i be the equilibrium prot of rm i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) with and without the entry
of rm n+ 1, respectively.
By substituting (n+1) into (n+1)i (), we obtain

(n+1)
i =
 
(n+ 2)c0  
n+1X
i=1
ci   ci
!2
(i = 1; 2; :::; n+ 1): (25)
From (7) and (25), we obtain

(n+1)
i   ni = 2(c0   cn+1)((n+ 1)c0  
nX
i=1
ci   ci) + (c0   cn+1)2 > 0:
This implies Proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 6
By substituting (15) into (16), we obtain
x() =
(c0   C)(n+ 1)((a  c0   n(c0   C))   (a  c0)(n   + 1)(n   + 2))X4
(   (n+ 1)(n   + 1)(n   + 2))X5 ; (26)
where X4 := (a   c0   n(c0   C)(n    + 2))   (n + 1)(a   c0)(n    + 1)(n    + 2), and
X5 := (a  c0   n(c0  C))22   (a  c0)(n   + 1)((a  c0)(n2    + 2n+ 3)  n(c0  C)(n+
17
n+3 ))+(a  c0)2(n+1)(n +1)(n +2), and both X4 and X5 are positive because
we assume that a and  are suciently large. From (13) and (26), we obtain
x   x() = (a  c0)(c0   C)(n+ 1)(n   + 1)X6
(   (n+ 1)(n   + 1)(n   + 2))X5 > 0;
where X6 := (a  c0   n(c0  C))   (a  c0)(n+ 1)(n   + 1)(n   + 2), and this is positive
because we assume that a and  are suciently large. These imply Proposition 6(i).
From (13), we obtain
@x
@
=
(n+ 1)(n  1)(c0   C)( + (n+ 1)(n   + 2)2)
(   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1))2 > 0:
This implies the former part of Proposition 6(ii).
From (16), we obtain
@x()
@
=   ((a  C)+ c0   C)X7
((1 + (n+ 1))2   (1 + )f1 + (n  1))(1 + n  (n  1)))2 < 0
where X7 := (1 + (n + 1))
2   (1 + )(1 + n   (n   1))2, and this is positive because we
assume that  is suciently large. This implies the latter part of Proposition 6(ii).
From (13), we obtain
@x
@n
=
(c0   C)(2(1 + n) + (n+ 1)2(n   + 2)2)
(   (n+ 1)(n   + 2)(n   + 1))2 > 0:
This implies the former part of Proposition 6(iii).
From (16), we obtain
@x()
@n
=   ((a  C)+ c0   C)X8
((1 + (n+ 1))2   (1 + )f1 + (n  1))(1 + n  (n  1)))2 < 0
where X8 := (n++1)(2(1+) +  +3   n) +2(1+)(1  )2n2  2(1+)(1 
)(1++)n 2(1+)(2++)  (1+)2(+ ), and this is positive for suciently
large . This implies the latter part of Proposition 6(iii). 
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